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Abstract We confront the philosophical literature on fair division problems with
axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics. Firstly, we show that the propor-
tionality method advocated in Curtis (in Analysis 74:417–57, 2014) is not implied
by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be explicated
axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we suggest that Broome’s (in Proc
Aristot Soc 91:87–101, 1990) notion of claims is too restrictive and that game-theoretic
approaches can rectify this shortcoming. More generally, we argue that axiomatic and
game-theoretic work in economics is an indispensable ingredient of any theorizing
about fair division problems and allocative justice.
Keywords Cooperative game theory · Fairness · Bankruptcy · Fair division ·
Proportionality
1 Introduction
There is not enough cake: somebody took most of it and now only five slices are left.
Lucwants three of them,Cas four, andSefwants two slices. There is not enoughmoney:
Alice has only 20 Euros left. She had borrowed 8 Euros fromAlex, 11 fromBen, and 5
from Sarah. Many situations in life are like that. When in charge of allocating a limited
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amount of an available good, a fair division problem arises: how do you ensure that
you treat everyone fairly?
Perhaps the best known theory of fairness that applies to such situations is that
of Broome (1990). Its core feature is that fairness is the proportional satisfaction of
claims, which are a certain type of reasons, owed to the agent, as to why an agent
should have the good. Broome (1990, p. 95) understands ‘proportional satisfaction’
in the following way: ‘I do not mean ‘proportion’ to be taken too precisely. But I
do mean that equal claims require equal satisfaction, that stronger claims require
more satisfaction than weaker ones, and also—very importantly—that weaker claims
require some satisfaction. Weaker claims may not be simply overridden by stronger
ones.’ Broome is thus quite non-committal about the notion of proportionality, and
his theory does not offer an actual method that describes ‘how to be fair’. In response
to this, Curtis (2014) has provided a new theory of fairness that spells out what he
maintains Broome’s (1990) theory has left out.
The core feature of Curtis’ theory is what he calls the proportionality method, a pro-
tocol to be used by the allocating agent to divide the good proportionally. Yet, like all
philosophical investigations into fair division problems of the type mentioned above
that we are aware of, Curtis develops his theory in isolation from axiomatic and coop-
erative game-theoretic approaches to fairness in economics, whose main focus is pre-
cisely to compare different methods of dividing a limited amount of an available good
(e.g. Herrero and Villar 2001; Thomson 2003; O’Neill 1982; Curiel et al. 1988). In this
paper, we analyze the philosophical literature on fair division problems from the view-
point of these approaches. We argue that the proportionality method does not follow
from the general principle of fairness fromwhich Curtis (2014) starts out. We also find
that several of the ‘Broomean’ assumptions that Curtis makes, which have so far been
the focal point of the recent philosophical literature on fairness, are equally implausi-
ble. In particular, Broome’s restricted notion ofwhat a ‘claim’ in a fair division problem
is, already criticized by Hooker (2005), Tomlin (2012), and Kirkpatrick and Eastwood
(2015), renders his theory of fairness inapplicable in many important contexts. The
economic literature, by contrast, offers a range of tools in which such assumptions can
be dropped, and thus offers a fruitful environment for the study of fairness.
We proceed as follows. In Sect. 2, we show that Curtis’ (2014) proportionality
method does not follow from the general principle of fairness that he adopts. First we
show that there are several fair division rules, studied in the economic literature, that are
consistent with it. We then invoke the axiomatic literature on fairness to investigate
whether there is an explication of the fairness principle that rescues Curtis’ claim.
We will consider a number of properties that jointly may serve as an explication
of Curtis’ principle of fairness and demonstrate that these do not jointly imply the
proportionality method. Finally, we argue that no explication of Curtis’ principle of
fairness will do so, by invoking Thomson’s (2012) distinction between punctual and
relational properties. In Sect. 3, we reflect briefly on the significance and usefulness of
the axiomatic approach for philosophical work on fair division problems. In Sect. 4,
we consider situations in which claims are not only less idealized than Broomean
(1990) claims, but rather implicit and intertwined with other aspects of the context at
hand. Solution concepts from cooperative game theory supply the necessary tools to
investigate fairness in such situations.Moreover, we demonstrate that there are cases in
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which cooperative game theory applies that cannot even be reduced to situations with
Broomean claims. We also point out a drawback of the proportional rule: unlike many
other division rules, it is not robust, as it cannot be characterized both axiomatically
and game theoretically. In Sect. 5, we reflect on the significance of our findings for
theorising about fair division problems and allocative justicemore generally. In Sect. 6,
we conclude.
2 Curtis on fairness
2.1 FC does not imply P
Consider the following situation.
Bankruptcy. Ari, Betty, and Claire have, respectively, deposited 800, 400 and 200
Euros on their savings account with the SAFE bank. However, SAFE goes bankrupt
and its liquidation value of 900 (the ‘estate’) has to be divided amongst Ari, Betty,
and Claire. Together, the money on their accounts adds up to 1400, and so a problem
arises. How should we, in order to be fair, divide the estate?
Recently,Curtis (2014) has provided an important new theoryof fairness that applies
to such problems.1 Curtis advocates his theory as spelling out what he maintains
Broome’s (1990) well-known theory of fairness has left out: an actual method that
describes ‘how to be fair’. Curtis (2014, p. 47) remarks that, to the best of his knowl-
edge, ‘neither Broome nor anyone else had laid down a theory of precisely what one
must do in order to be fair’. Yet, fair division problems like Bankruptcy have been stud-
ied extensively, both axiomatically (see Herrero and Villar 2001 and Thomson 2003
for overviews) and from the perspective of cooperative game theory (see e.g. O’Neill
1982 or Curiel et al. 1988). There is a long history to the study of such problems. For
instance, the Talmud discusses a division rule, which has been studied formally by
Aumann and Maschler (1985).
Classical examples of division rules are the rule of ‘constrained equalized awards’
(CEA), the ‘proportional rule’ (P), and the rule of ‘constrained equalized losses’ (CEL).
There are many more rules in the axiomatic and game-theoretic literature, with some
of the most important ones being introduced in this paper as we go along. Let us for
now focus on the three rules just mentioned and apply them to Bankruptcy. The CEA
rule equalizes the awards as much as possible, under the constraint that no agent can
receive more than his or her claim.2 In Bankruptcy, the estate is 900 and so allotting
1 Curtis’ theory applies both to cases in which the allocated good is infinitely divisible and to cases in
which it is not. The proportionality method is the cornerstone of his treatment of both cases however, and
Curtis’ treatment of the non-infinitely divisible case is an extension of his treatment of the infinitely divisible
one. For our purposes, it suffices to restrict ourselves to the simpler case in which the good is infinitely
divisible. However, it needs to be said that fair division problems with a non-infinitely divisible good are
less well-studied in the economic literature that we consider here than those in which the good is infinitely
divisible.
2 We will make the notion of ‘claim’ more precise in the next sections. For the moment, we just take the
amounts of Euros in Bankruptcy at face value. In Sect. 4.1, we will deal with a potential rejoinder from
Curtis that is based on a specific notion of what a claim is.
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Table 1 Division rules and their
recommended awards for
Bankruptcy
Agents Claims CEA P CEL
Ari 800 350 514.3¯ 633.3¯
Betty 400 350 257.1¯ 233.3¯
Claire 200 200 128.6¯ 33.3¯
300 to each of the agents equalizes the awards. However, doing so would give Claire
more than her claim of 200. So Claire gets 200 and the remaining 700 is shared equally
between Ari and Betty. Now none of the three agents gets more than his or her claim,
and the resulting allocation is the one prescribed by the CEA rule, as indicated in
Table 1.
Further, P divides the estate in proportion to the size of the claims of the respective
agents. Finally, the CEL rule equalizes the losses that the agents suffer with respect to
their claims under the constraint that no agent can loose more than his or her claim.
Suppose that we (‘temporarily’) allot Ari, Betty and Claire the totality of their claims.
This would result in an infeasible allocation, as we would distribute 1,400 whereas the
estate is only 900. To reach a feasible allocation, the CEL rule proposes that the agents
equally share the aggregate loss of 1,400−900 = 500. Hence, the CEL rule proposes
that each agent loses 166.7¯ relative to his or her claim, resulting in the allocation that
is depicted in Table 1 above.
For claims problems like Bankruptcy, Curtis (2014) endorses the proportional rule
P. Indeed, P is the cornerstone of his theory of fairness. What is more, he motivates
adopting it by claiming that the proportional rule is entailed by a general principle of
fairness that he adopts:
The Fairness Claim (FC). In order to be fair an allocating agent must (i) do as much
as she can to satisfy the claim of each receiving agent to as great a degree as possible
whilst ensuring that (ii) each claim is treated equally (Curtis 2014, p. 49).
Now FC is fairly general and open to interpretation. But Curtis does not provide
any. Rather, he simply states that the allocating agent ‘divides …proportionally is
demanded by part (ii) [of FC]’ and that ‘it is also clear that FC tells [the allocating
agent] to follow method P’ (Curtis 2014, p. 49). In a nutshell, Curtis claims that FC
implies P.
We submit that the content of FC is too vague to single out P as the only division
rule that is consistent with it. For one thing, all the rules we introduced in the above
example realise FC (i) and of all of them it can reasonably be said that they treat each
claim equally. To be sure, P does not seem to be in conflict with FC, and it can be
argued that P is a plausible way to realise FC. But to the extent to which that can be
argued, the same can be said about the CEA and CEL rules. FC is simply open to
many interpretations and does not lead to one division rule. In other words: FC does
not imply P.
We have already mentioned that many division rules have been developed in the
axiomatic literature. In Sect. 2.2, we will employ this literature to propose an explica-
tion of FC. As we will see, our FC explication does not imply P. In Sect. 2.3 we go on
to argue that no plausible explication of FC in the axiomatic approach can imply P.
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The following two sections, as well as Sects. 4.2 and 4.3, are more technical than
the rest of the article, which we indicate by putting a star next to their title. While
the general message of the article is conveyed by the non-starred sections, the starred
sections demonstrate the fruitfulness of the axiomatic and game-theoretic methods for
theorizing about fair divisions in detail.
2.2 Explicating FC: using the axiomatic approach
The axiomatic approach analyzes cases like Bankruptcy as fair division problems with
a specific structure, which is that of a so-called claims problem.
Definition 1 A claims problem C := (E, N , c) consists of an estate E > 0, a set of
agents N = {1, . . . , n} and a claims vector c ∈ RN+ specifying a claim ci for each
agent i such that
∑
i∈N ci > E .
A multitude of division rules for claims problems have been proposed and studied
in the literature.
Definition 2 A division rule r is a function that maps each claims problem (E, N , c)
to an allocation vector x ∈ RN+ , with the property that xi ≤ ci for each agent i : no
agent receives more than his claim.
On the axiomatic approach, such rules are characterized in terms of logically inde-
pendent properties which facilitates a fruitful comparison of (the fairness of) distinct
division rules. One of the rules considered is the proportional one, about which Thom-
son remarks:
The best-known rule is the proportional rule, which chooses awards proportional
to claims. Proportionality is often taken as the definition of fairness [...], but
we will challenge this position and start from more elementary considerations.
(Thomson 2003, p. 250).
Indeed, Curtis does not want to take proportionality as the definition of fairness,
but wants to start from more elementary considerations that are encapsulated in FC.
And so, the axiomatic approach seems to be highly relevant for Curtis’ project.
Let us first illustrate the main tenets of the axiomatic approach by exploring the
division rules already mentioned earlier. The CEA, P and CEL rule all have the Effi-
ciency property as, in each claims problem, the rules allocate all of the available
estate. Another property that is common to the three rules is that of Equal Treatment
of Equals, which says that (in each claims problem) agentswith the same claims receive
the same amount. Efficiency and Equal Treatment of Equals are logically independent
properties: a division rule may satisfy Efficiency without satisfying Equal Treatment
of Equals, or vice versa. Further, Efficiency and Equal Treatment of Equals are shared
by lots of division rules, and hence these properties do not (jointly) characterize a
division rule, i.e. there is no unique division rule satisfying them. To characterize a
division rule is to identify a rule as the only one that satisfies a certain set of (preferably
logically independent) properties.
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The core business of the axiomatic approach is exactly to characterize division rules
in this sense. Such characterizations facilitate a fruitful comparison of (the fairness of)
distinct division rules. In this section, we will use the axiomatic approach to explicate
FC.
Remember that Curtis (2014, p. 49) says, ‘that [the allocating agent] must use
all of the good is demanded by part (i) of FC’. In terms of the axiomatic approach,
Curtis claims that FC (i) demands a division rule that satisfies Efficiency.With this, we
have no qualms. However, it should be noted that at this point, Curtis’ theory differs
from that of Broome. According to Broome, fairness is a strictly comparative value
that only requires the proportional satisfaction of claims: Broome denies that fairness
requires Efficiency. Allotting 8 Euros to Ari, 4 Euros to Betty and 2 Euros to Claire in
Bankruptcy is, according to Broome, just as fair as the division proposed by P. Various
authors have objected to the Broomean thought that fairness is strictly comparative.
For instance, Hooker (2005, p. 341) argues that, pace Broome, ‘fairness requires the
greatest possible satisfaction of claims’. Indeed, Curtis states that he departs from
Broome regarding this point, for the same reasons given by Hooker. Thus, although
it is clear that FC (i) expresses Efficiency, it is debatable whether fairness requires
Efficiency, i.e. whether Efficiency is a fairness property. For the purpose of this paper,
however, we will simply follow Curtis and Hooker and assume that Efficiency, which
is expressed by FC (i), is a fairness property.
Which fairness properties— allegedly characterizing P in the presence of
Efficiency—are expressed by FC (ii)? Recall that FC (ii) is fairly general and open
to interpretation. But perhaps we can invoke the axiomatic approach to understand its
content in a more precise way. To do so, we look for a characterization of P in terms of
properties that best reflect the phrase ‘to treat equal claims equally’. For this purpose,
the following characterization of P looks attractive.
Theorem 1 The proportional rule P is the only division rule that satisfies the following
logically independent properties: Efficiency, Equal Treatment of Equals, Self-Duality
and Composition.
Proof See Young (1988). unionsq
Let us first explain these properties in turn. We already encountered Efficiency and
Equal Treatment of Equals. Explaining Self-Duality requires a little more work. Given
a claims problem (E, N , c) and a division rule r that satisfies Efficiency, there are two
canonical manners in which r can be exploited to divide the estate amongst the agents.
First, by applying r directly to the problem at hand. Second, by applying r to the loss
problem (
∑
i∈N ci − E, N , c) that is associated with (E, N , c), and by diminishing
each agent’s claim with the loss that is allocated to him or her as such. Thus, we may
exploit r either to ‘divide what there is’ or to ‘allocate what is missing’. The second
manner to divide the estate may also be thought of as applying the dual rule r of r to
(E, N , c):
r (E, N , c) = c − r (L , N , c) , with L =
∑
i∈N
ci − E the aggregate loss.
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Indeed, each efficient division rule comes with a dual rule.Whereas CEA is the dual
rule of CEL (and vice versa), the dual rule of P is P itself, which is to say that P satisfies
Self-Duality. For self-dual rules, ‘dividing what there is’ is tantamount to ‘allocating
what is missing’: such rules treat awards and losses in a symmetrical manner. When a
division rule satisfiesComposition, it doesn’t matter whether we divide all of the estate
E at once or whether we divide, first, a part E1 of the estate and, second, the remainder
E2 according to the outstanding claims after the first stage. More precisely, a division
rule r satisfies Composition just in case, for all E1, E2 > 0 such that E1 + E2 = E ,
we have that:
r(E, N , c) = r(E1, N , c) + r(E2, N , c − r(E1, N , c))
Theorem 1 thus tells us that Efficiency, Equal Treatment of Equals, Self-Duality and
Composition jointly characterize P. How then, are these properties related to FC? As
we already discussed, Efficiency is expressed by FC (i) and—although debatable—
we assume that fairness requires Efficiency. Equal Treatment of Equals wears its
interpretation on its sleeves: (agents with) equal claims should receive the same, i.e.
they should be treated equally.As FC (ii) says that each claim should be treated equally,
it follows fromFC (ii) that, in particular, equal claims should be treated as such. Hence,
Equal Treatment of Equals is implied by FC (ii). What about Self-Duality? Although
Self-Duality is not, strictly speaking, implied by FC (ii), treating awards and losses
in a symmetrical manner can, being charitable to Curtis, be understood as treating
claims equally: whereas CEA and CEL are biased towards equalizing awards and
losses respectively, and do not satisfy Self-Duality, P is free of these biases and treats
each claim equally, no matter whether we allocate what is there or what is missing.
What about the last property on our list, Composition? Here, we feel that we run
out of charity. Not only do we not see any relation between FC (ii) and Composition,
we think that it is hard to see any relation between fairness and Composition at all. We
concur withHerrero andVillar (2001), who classify Composition as a requirement that
prevents an allocation to depend on the way in which a claims problem is subdivided
into partial problems. Thus, although one might interpret Composition as a generally
desirable property, it is hard to qualify it as a fairness property. Moreover, like Effi-
ciency and Equal treatment of Equals, Composition is a property that is common to
CEA, P and CEL. Hence, not only is the relation between Composition and fairness
opaque, Composition does not, whereas Self-Duality does, allow us to distinguish
CEA and CEL from P.
Efficiency, Equal Treatment of Equals and Self-Duality do not jointly characterize
P, which follows from Theorem 1 and which is illustrated more vividly by the fact that
they are also satisfied by the Talmud rule (cf. Aumann andMaschler 1985), the Run to
the Bank rule (cf. O’Neill 1982) and the Adjusted Proportional rule (cf. Curiel et al.
1988).3 We discuss the Adjusted Proportional (AP) rule in some detail here, as it will
play a role in the remainder of the paper.
3 For proofs that the Talmud, Run to the Bank and Adhusted Proportional rule satisfy Efficiency, Equal
Treatment of Equals and Self-Duality see, respectively, Aumann and Maschler (1985), O’Neill (1982) and
Curiel et al. (1988).
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The AP rule exploits the notion of the minimal right of an agent, which is that
part of the estate that would be left when the claims of all other agents were fully
satisfied. In Bankruptcy, completely satisfying the claims of Betty and Claire would
leave 900 − 400 − 200 = 300 for Ari, which is his minimal right. The minimal
rights of Betty and Claire are 0 for each. The AP rule proposes to distribute minimal
rights first. Doing so in Bankruptcy leaves us with an estate of 900 − 300 = 600,
which is called the remaining estate. Further, allotting Ari’s minimal right reduces his
original claim with 300, resulting in a reduced claim of 800 − 300 = 500 which, as
this reduced claim does not exceed the remaining estate, is also his remaining claim4.
The remaining claims for Betty and Claire are thus equal to their original claims of,
respectively, 400 and 200. The AP rule distributes minimal rights first and then divides
the remaining estate according to the remaining claims, resulting in an allocation that
allots 572.7¯ to Ari, 218.2¯ to Betty, and 109.1¯ to Claire.
As the AP rule satisfies Efficiency, Equal Treatment of Equals and Self-Duality it
cannot, in virtue of Theorem 1, satisfy Composition. However, as Composition is not
even remotely connected to FC, Curtis cannot appeal to Composition to argue that
P is preferable to AP according to his conception of fairness. But perhaps there are
other properties—more in line with FC—that would allow Curtis to do so? Consider
the property of Strict Order Preservation, which says that whenever a claims problem
C is such that agent i has a claim that is strictly greater than the claim of agent j ,
the amount allotted to i should be strictly greater than the amount allotted to j . Strict
Order Preservation seems to be not too far removed from the content of FC (ii) and
certainly to be in its spirit: remember that Broome (1990, p. 95) writes that ‘stronger
claims require more satisfaction than weaker ones’ which is tantamount to Strict Order
Preservation.Moreover, P does satisfy Strict Order Preservation, whereas AP does not.
The former is immediate from its definition, the latter is readily verified by considering
a claims problem in which there are two agents that have unequal claims which both
exceed the available estate. The following lemma, which will be exploited later on,
attests that AP only violates Strict Order Preservation in claims problems that satisfy
the aforementioned condition.
Lemma 1 Let (E, N , c) be a claims problem and let k, l ∈ N be such that ck < cl .
Then, APk(E, N , c) < APl(E, N , c) if and only if ck < E.
Proof See the appendix. unionsq
Weuse Lemma 1 in the proof of the following proposition, where we present a division
rule—called theComposite Proportional rule for reasons that will become apparent—
that satisfies Efficiency, Equal Treatment of Equals, Self-Duality and Strict Order
Preservation, but that does not coincide with P.
Proposition 1 Efficiency, Equal Treatment of Equals, Self-Duality and Strict Order
Preservation do not characterize P.
4 If the reduced claim exceeds the remaining estate, the remaining claim is set equal to the remaining estate.
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Proof With L = ∑i∈N ci − E the aggregate loss, the Composite Proportional rule
CP is defined as follows.
CP(E, N , c) =
{
P(E, N , c) ∃ k, l ∈ N : ck < cl and (ck ≥ E or ck ≥ L);
AP(E, N , c) otherwise
That rule CP satisfies Efficiency and Equal Treatment of Equals follows immediately
from the fact that P and AP do. To see that R satisfies Self-Duality observe that CP
is defined in such a way that for each claims problem (E, N , c) either CP applies P
to both (E, N , c) and (L , N , c) or CP applies AP to both (E, N , c) and (L , N , c).
And so, as both P and AP are Self-Dual, so is CP. To see that CP satisfies Strict Order
Preservation, observe that it follows from Lemma 1 that CP applies P—which satisfies
StrictOrder Preservation—to a claims problemwhen applying theAP rulewould result
in a violation of Strict Order Preservation. Finally, observe that R proposes to apply
AP to Bankruptcy and that P and AP do not coincide on Bankruptcy. Hence CP does
not coincide with P. unionsq
Proposition 1 shows that the explication of FC in terms of Efficiency, Equal Treat-
ment of Equals, Self-Duality and Strict Order Preservation does not imply P. We will
now go on to argue that no (satisfactory) explication of FC can imply P, since that is
prevented by the type of properties that are referred to by FC.
2.3 Limits to FC explications: relational properties
How might Curtis react to Proposition 1? While we do not know that, the following
reaction seems natural.
Reaction Proposition 1 crucially relies on your rule CP. However, rule CP is ad hoc, as
it proposes to apply P or AP, depending on whether some cooked up formal condition
obtains. A minimal requirement on a fair division rule is exactly that it is not ad hoc,
or more positively, that it exhibits something like ‘regularity’ or ‘predictability’. The
ad hoc character of CP reveals that is not a fair division rule. P is vastly superior.
Indeed, CP has an ‘ad hoc character’ and we sympathise with the thought that this
is incompatible with fairness. But then, we may ask, how can we find out whether a
given rule is ‘ad hoc’ in this way? Here is a proposal. A division rule r satisfies Estate
Continuity5 just in case small changes in the estate do not lead to large changes in the
allocation vector that is proposed by r . The ad hoc character of CP can be explained
by its violation of Estate Continuity, and this violation can be illustrated as follows.
Suppose that Ari, Betty, and Claire have claims of 800, 400, and 200 with respect to
an estate of 400.1. Inspection reveals that rule CP proposes to apply AP to this claims
problem, resulting in an allocation of 160.1¯ for Ari. However, if the estate would be
slightly lowered to 400 (leaving the claims as they are), CP proposes to apply P, which
5 Formally, r satisfies Estate Continuity just in case ri (E, N , c) is a continuous function in E , for each
i ∈ N .
123
Synthese
results in an allocation of 228.6¯ for Ari. Hence, a small change in the estate results in
a large change in the awards vector, which shows that CP violates Estate Continuity.
By appealing to Estate Continuity, we may thus account for the ad hoc character
of CP and, as P satisfies Estate Continuity, this property can be used to distinguish
P from CP. Moreover, one may even go further and argue that Estate Continuity is a
property that any fair division rule should have. One may, but Curtis cannot. Or so we
will argue. It is not only hard to see how, intuitively, Estate Continuity is related to
FC, we will also show that FC does not give us access to relational properties such as
Estate Continuity; all that FC has access to are punctual properties.
The distinction between punctual and relational properties is due to Thomson
(2012). To illustrate this distinction, we contrast the property of Strict Order Preser-
vation, as discussed before, with that Strict Claim Monotonicity. When two claims
problems C and C′ are exactly alike, except for the fact that there is exactly one agent,
say i , who has a strictly larger claim in problem C′ than in C, Strict ClaimMonotonic-
ity says that agent i should receive strictly more in problem C′ than in problem C. In
some sense, both Strict Order Preservation and Strict Claim Monotonicity can be said
to give substance to the thought that ‘stronger claims require more satisfaction’. In
contrast to Strict Order Preservation though, Strict Claim Monotonicity allows one to
distinguish P from our CP rule, as the following proposition attests.
Proposition 2 P does and CP does not satisfy Strict Claim Monotonicity.
Proof See Appendix. unionsq
Now given that the substance of Strict ClaimMonotonicity is not too far removed from
that of Strict Order Preservation, and given that the latter property may legitimately
serve in an FC explication, can’t Curtis appeal to Strict Claim Monotonicity in order
to distinguish P from CP? No he cannot, for although the substance of Strict Claim
Monotonicity may not be too far removed from that of Strict Order Preservation, it is
a property of a different type.
Strict Order Preservation is a punctual property. In order to satisfy a punctual
property, a division rule has to respect a certain condition in every claims problem.
Now a division rule satisfies Strict Order Preservation just in case, in every claims
problem ‘strictly higher claims receive strictly more satisfaction’. Hence, Strict Order
Preservation is a punctual property. Strict ClaimMonotonicity is a relational property.
In order to satisfy a relational property, a division rule has to respect a certain condition
pertaining to each tuple of claims problems that are related in a certain way. Now a
division rule satisfies Strict Claim Monotonicity just in case, for every pair of claims
problems C and C′ that are related as described above, agent i receives strictly more
in C′ than in C. Hence, Strict Claim Monotonicity is a relational property.
FC can only be explicated by punctual properties as both FC (i) and FC (ii) specify
what a fair allocating agent must do in every claims problem. In particular, FC(ii)
specifies that in order to be fair, an allocating agent must ‘ensure that [in every claims
problem] each claim is treated equally’. As FC can only express punctual properties,
we take it that it is reasonable to require, of an explication of FC, that it only appeals
to punctual properties: call this the FC Explication Requirement. And so, according
to the FC Explication Requirement, no explication of FC can appeal to Strict Claim
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Monotonicity or Estate Continuity. Thus, although these properties allow one to sep-
arate P from CP, Curtis cannot justify this separation by appealing to FC.
Just like Strict Order Preservation, Efficiency and Equal Treatment of Equals are
clear instances of punctual properties. Moreover, these three properties are not only of
the right type to serve in an explication of FC, but also their substance is closely related
to that of FC. Hence, their occurrence in an FC explication is unproblematic. But what
about Self-Duality? As discussed in Sect. 2.2, one may argue that Self-Duality can
be related to FC(ii), and we considered FC explications that appealed to Self-Duality.
However, the FC Explication Requirement rules out such appeal. Prima facie though,
there seems to be some leeway to argue that Self-Duality is a punctual property. For
don’t we say, informally, that Self-Duality requires that, in every claims problem,
awards and losses are to be treated symmetrically? And don’t we say, formally, that
Self-Duality requires that in every claims problem, applying a division rule r and its
dual rule r result in the same allocation?The problemwith such informal paraphrasing
of Self-Duality is that it is too imprecise to be helpful. For what does it mean to treat
awards and losses symmetrically? To say that it means that r and r must coincide
in every claims problem serves as a legitimate answer to that question. However, that
answer does not allow one to conclude that Self-Duality is a punctual property. Indeed,
the application of r to (E, N , c) is defined in terms of the application of r to (L , N , c),
which is another claims problem that is related to (E, N , c). The following definition
of Self-Duality lays bare its relational nature.
Definition 3 (Self-Duality) Let (E, N , c) and (E ′, N ′, c′) be claims problems that are
related as follows:
E ′ =
∑
i∈N
ci − E, N ′ = N , c′ = c (1)
A division rule r satisfies Self-Duality iff for any two claims problems that respect
(1), we have that
r (E, N , c) = c − r (E ′, N ′, c′) (2)
Definition 3 shows that Self-Duality is a relational property: if claims problems
are related as in (1)—the application condition of Self-Duality—then a division rule
must, in order satisfy Self-Duality, treat them as in (2)—the treatment condition of
Self-Duality. Being a relational property, the FC Explication Requirement precludes
Self-Duality from figuring in an FC explication. Of course, the same goes for the other
relational property that figured in Theorem 1: Composition6.
We investigated, by invoking the axiomatic approach, whether FC can be expli-
cated in terms of properties of division rules and whether we could come up with
an explication of FC that characterizes (or implies) P. We started out by considering
a particular characterization of P due to Young (1988), viz. Theorem 1. As the sub-
stance of three of the four properties appealed to in this characterization seems not
be too far removed from FC, Theorem 1 seems to be an attractive starting point for
6 In fact, Composition is an example of what Thomson (2012) calls a post-application relational property,
whereas Self-Duality is a it pre-application relational property. For sake of completeness, the appendix
explains this interesting difference between pre- and post-application relational properties in terms of Self-
Duality and Composition.
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“FC explication investigations” such as ours. Although Young’s characterization of
P is attractive in this sense, it must be noted that several characterizations of P have
been given in the axiomatic literature. We feel that, of these characterizations, the
one by Young is closest in spirit to FC. More importantly though, to the best of our
knowledge, all characterizations of P that have been proposed in the literature exploit
relational properties. Thus, no such characterization can, according to the FC Expli-
cation Requirement, serve as an adequate explication of FC. That is not to say that it
is (logically) impossible to characterize P in terms of punctual properties only. Such
is illustrated by the Trivial Proportionality property, which is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Trivial Proportionality) A division rule r satisfies Trivial Proportional-
ity just in case, in every claims problem (E, N , c):
ri (E, N , c) = ci∑
j∈N c j
· E for each i ∈ N
Indeed, Trivial Proportionality is a punctual property and P is the unique division rule
that satisfies Trivial Proportionality. However, Trivial Proportionality can only be said
to characterize P in a trivial and uninformative manner.
We think that our discussion in this section warrants the following conclusion: there
cannot be a non-trivial axiomatic explication of FC that yields P in the above sense,
since it will rely on axiomatic properties of a type that clearly go beyond FC.
3 Interlude: methods for fairness
Let us reflect on the preceding explorations of the relation between FC and P a bit more
generally. In Sect. 2.1 we showed that many division rules (such as CEA and CEL,
and arguably many others) realise the fairness principle FC. Crucially, the axiomatic
approachdoes not play a role in arguing this. In Sect. 2.2,we then invoked the axiomatic
approach to investigate in what way FC can be explicated, and whether such an expli-
cation yields P as the only fair division rule. We concluded Sect. 2.2 negatively. In
Sect. 2.3, we offered some thoughts on the underlying reasons for this, by pointing to
the distinction between punctual and relational properties.
Where do these findings leave us? While our investigations have yielded a negative
conclusion forCurtis’ specific claim,wedo think thatmuchofwhatwehaveofferedhas
been constructive and actually results in a profound challenge to the fairness literature,
in particular to Broomean theories, according to which proportional satisfaction of
claims is the hallmark of fairness: can the intuitive connection between fairness and
proportionality be accounted for on more fundamental grounds? Curtis has made an
important start in investigating and answering this question. The axiomatic approach
was helpful in showing that there are problems with his answer, and provides the
necessary tools to make debates about this challenge precise.
The more general methodological message from applying the axiomatic approach
to Curtis’ theory of fairness is that any such theory needs to be more explicit in
providing a conception of fairness, a specific method that realises it in concrete cases,
and a clear story of how the two are connected. We think that the axiomatic approach
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will be a valuable tool to do so for anyone invested in theorising about fair division
problems. We will, however, not go on to offer our own theory of fairness based on the
axiomatic investigations in this paper. There are three reasons for this: firstly, while
we have already included a fair amount of detail of some of the formal properties
discussed in the literature, these were primarily geared towards investigating Curtis’
claim, and there are many others that will require considerations for any such more
general project. It is thus wise to leave that for elsewhere. Secondly, recall that we also
mentioned the cooperative game-theoretic literature in the introduction of the paper.
It is our view that the results in that literature also deserve consideration and inclusion
in an effort to provide a theory of fairness that satisfy the desiderata mentioned here.
We thus want to spend the remainder of the paper to demonstrate the relevance of
that literature as well. Indeed, there are important challenges to the proportional rule
from cooperative game theory ahead. Thirdly and lastly, the Broomean literature on
fairness also debates questions concerning the underlying notion of what a claim is,
and we will go on to show that these point directly to the game-theoretic methods.
4 More fairness
4.1 Beyond simple claims
Curtis might also try to defend his theory in a different way: he might try to further
spell out his, by and large tacit, assumption of what it means to have a claim, which so
far we have simply taken at face value. Curtis actually did the same, but also mentions
that he takes his ‘cue from Broome’s theory of fairness’ (Curtis 2014, p. 47). Indeed,
Curtis expresses claims in Broomean terms: that is, claims are a perfect record of what
agents deserve, they are a duty to the agent (Broome 1990, p. 92f.). Broome is non-
committal as to how such claims are constituted. They may arise due to, for instance,
desert, needs, or agreement. For Broome, a claim is thus a specific type of reason why
an agent should get the good: a reason that is owed to the agent herself. Claims are to
be distinguished from teleological reasons and from side-constraints, where the latter
are reasons that necessarily prevail and determine directly what ought to be done.
If we adopt the ‘claims as duties’-definition for Bankruptcy, then P seems to have
some advantages over CEA and CEL as the latter two rules have some re-distributive
properties (this will be intuitively plausible when consulting the table that showed how
the three rules divide the estate in Bankruptcy). In less idealized circumstances, CEA
and CELmight capture fairness better. Think for instance about an allocation situation
quite similar to Bankruptcy in terms of the numbers, but in which the good and claims
in question do not reflect Broomean duties. For instance, think of the numbers as
representing resources that different agents require to survive. It may well be the case
that there is a minimal threshold of resources belowwhich it is impossible for an agent
to survive. Then it might be more natural to adopt CEA, which equalizes the awards
as much as possible, ensuring a minimal threshold is passed. Alternatively, think of
the numbers as representing investments in risky financial products. Then it might be
more natural to adopt CEL, which equalizes the losses. All this does help Curtis only
to some extent: even when adopting a Broomean definition of a claim, we would still
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need an explicit argument for why P would follow from FC as the only fair division
rule.
Broome’s (1990) account of fairness has been criticized on various grounds that are
connected to his notion of a claim being overly idealized and restrictive (Hooker 2005;
Tomlin 2012; Kirkpatrick and Eastwood 2015). For instance, Hooker (2005) argues
that, pace Broome, fairness is not insensitive to side-constraints. Another criticism is
due to Tomlin (2012), who argues that claims can be (un-)fair by themselves and that
Broome cannot account for this feature given that he understands fairness as consisting
(solely) of the proportional satisfaction of claims. Thus, Hooker challenges Broome’s
view that fairness is only concernedwith claims, whereas Tomlin challenges Broome’s
view that claims are logically prior to fairness. The restrictions inherent in Broome’s
notion of claims and the criticisms voiced byHooker (2005) andTomlin (2012) suggest
that a theory of fairness, in order to be applicable to a broader set of important cases,
should not be bound to a specific idea of claims as what is owed to the agent.
The question thus arises: How can we be fair when we cannot describe claims in
terms of Broomean duties, but merely as aspirations or preferences of agents, or as
their contribution levels, or else? And what about situations in which we do not really
know what claims there are, for instance because that information is not at hand, or
it cannot be easily inferred from the context? Can we also consider fairness in such
situations?
In order to illustrate these questions, consider the following situation.
Gloves. A(nn) owns 1 left glove and 2 right gloves, B(ernie) own 3 left gloves and 1
right glove and C(harlie) owns 0 left gloves and 1 right glove. At the market, pairs of
gloves can be sold for 1 Euro and each pair that is offered for sale is actually sold. The
agents can go to he market individually, in pairs, or all three of them together. How
should the revenue be divided?
When the agents enter the market as individuals, they will each sell the pairs of gloves
that they own. By doing so, Ann and Bernie will earn 1 Euro, and Charlie won’t earn
anything. However, when the three agents join forces and enter the market together,
they can pool their gloves, form 4 pairs and thus jointly earn 4 Euros. As the sum of
the individual earnings is only 2, the three agents have a clear incentive to join forces.
And when they do so, the question arises how, in order to be fair, the 4 Euros must be
divided amongst the three agents. Here is a comprehensive list of the earnings v for
all different combinations of cooperating agents:
v (∅) = 0 v ({A}) = 1 v ({B}) = 1 v ({C}) = 0
v ({A, B}) = 3 v ({A,C}) = 1 v ({B,C}) = 2 v ({A, B,C}) = 4 (3)
In some ways, Gloves resembles the fair division problems considered by Curtis.
There is however one important exception: the agents are not endowed with claims.
We do know the potential revenue they get from cooperating in various constellations,
but we do not know which duties we owe to the agents.
As there are different options for each agent to cooperate with other agents, and as
the revenue that can be gained from such cooperations varies, agents have different
incentives to cooperate. To see this aspect more clearly, consider the following table,
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Table 2 Marginal contributions
in gloves
Order MCA MCB MCC
A, B,C 1 2 1
A,C, B 1 3 0
B, A,C 2 1 1
B,C, A 2 1 1
C, A, B 1 3 0
C, B, A 2 2 0
Sum MCi ’s 9 12 3
which lists the ‘marginal contribution’ (MC) of each agent in all possible cooperation
scenarios, as well as the sum of them.
The table can be understood as follows. Consider the rowwhich describes the scenario
in which the agents cooperate in the order A,C,B. First, A is alone and receives
v({A}) = 1. Then C enters, the two players form a coalition and C receives his
marginal contribution of v({A,C}) − v({A}) = 1 − 1 = 0. Finally, B enters, the
three players now present form the ‘grand coalition’ of all players and B receives his
marginal contribution of v({A, B,C})−v({A,C}) = 4−1 = 3. There are thus clearly
differences in the marginal difference that the agents make in the various settings.
The problem is this. Clearly, we do have intuitions that there will be allocations of
revenue that are more fair than others. Yet, neither Broome’s nor Curtis’ theory can tell
us what an allocating agent must do in Gloves in order to be fair. In the following, we
will introduce the cooperative game theory approach that provides tools to investigate
Gloves and similar cases. In Sect. 4.2, we will introduce solution values in cooperative
game theory. In Sect. 4.3, we will invoke cooperative game-theory to spell out and
argue for the following two claims: (i) unlike other division rules, P lacks a certain
kind of robustness, (ii) it is not possible to understand the Gloves situation as being
induced by a claims problem, which blocks the potential Broomean rejoinder that
fairness is fundamentally a function of claims.
4.2 Fairness beyond simple claims: using cooperative game theory
Gloves as given by (3) is the cooperative game induced by Gloves; let’s call it the
Gloves Game. More generally, a cooperative game is defined as follows.
Definition 5 A cooperative game is a pair (N , v), with N = {1, . . . , n} a set of
agents and with v : 2N → R+, v(∅) = 0 the characteristic function of the game
which specifies the value that each group of cooperating agents (or coalition) can
guarantee itself. In particular, v(N ) represents the value that the grand coalition N
can guarantee itself.
Whereas division rules apply to claims problems, solution values apply to cooper-
ative games.
Definition 6 A solution value S is a function that maps each cooperative game (N , v)
to an allocation vector x ∈ RN+ with the property that
∑
i∈N xi ≤ v(N ).
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Typically, a solution value satisfies Efficiency which means, unsurprisingly, that
in each cooperative game, it allocates all of v(N ). Another property that is common
to (virtually) all solution values that have been proposed in the literature is that of
Individual Rationality, according to which the value that is allotted to agent i should
always be at least v({i}), i.e. the value that she can guarantee by herself. Various
solution values have been proposed in the literature and all of them can and typically
are understood as proposals to divide the value of the grand coalition ‘in a fair way’7.
Prominent solution values that have been proposed in the literature are the Shapley
value (cf. Shapley 1953), the nucleolus (cf. Schmeidler 1969), and the τ -value (cf.
Tijs 1981). Roughly speaking, the Shapley value proposes that a fair allocation of
v(N ) consists in each agent receiving an amount that is equal to his or her ‘average
marginal contribution’ with respect to all coalitions in which the agent may occur. (In
Gloves, these are ϕ(v)A = 96 , ϕ(v)B = 126 , and ϕ(v)C = 36 , which are obtained by
dividing the last line of Table 2 for each agent with the number of possible ‘cooperation
orders’, which is 6.) The nucleolus proposes that a fair allocation of v(N ) is given by
that allocation that ‘minimizes the maximal complaint that a coalition can have with
respect to an allocation’. Although these descriptions of the Shapley value and the
nucleolus are informal, they do reveal that the rationale of these solution values does
not involve the notion of proportionality. In contrast, for the τ -value, the notion of
proportionality does play an important role. We will discuss this value in more detail.
Here is how the τ -value proposes to allocate the 4 Euros in Gloves on the basis
of the Gloves Game v as given by (3). First, we compute the marginal contribution
that each of the agents makes with respect to the grand coalition. As an example,
the marginal contribution of Ann is equal to v(N ) − v({B,C}) = 4 − 2 = 2. This
marginal contribution is interpreted as an upper payoff as certainly, it is the maximum
value that Ann can expect to receive in an allocation of v(N ). Writing UA = 2 to
denote that the upper payoff of Ann is 2, we also find that UB = 3 and that UC = 1.
Likewise, the lower payoff of an agent represents the minimum value that an agent can
expect to receive in an allocation of v(N ). To obtain the lower payoff of Bernie, we
reason as follows. The lower payoff of Bernie is at least 1, for this much he can obtain
by acting alone: v({B}) = 1. On the other hand, Bernie can also propose to form a
coalition with Ann (and without Charlie) by offering Ann her upper payoff of 2 Euros.
Given that she is offered her upper payoff, Ann will accept this proposal. By forming
a coalition, Ann and Bernie jointly realize 3 Euros which means that, when Ann has
received her upper payoff, 1 is left for Bernie. So Bernie cannot only guarantee 1 Euro
by acting alone but also via the proposal to Ann that we just sketched. Finally, Bernie
may also propose to form the grand coalition and offer both Ann and Charlie their
upper payoffs, in which case there is 4− 2− 1 = 1 left for him. In all three scenarios,
Bernie can guarantee 1 Euro and so his lower payoff, which is the maximum of the
amounts he can guarantee in the three scenarios, is also 1 Euro: LB = 1. Likewise,
7 Just like for division rules, there are two ways in which the notion of fairness that is captured by a solution
value can be understood. One can do so axiomatically, i.e. in terms of the fairness of more basic properties
that jointly characterize a solution value. Or one can do so procedurally, i.e. in terms of the fairness of the
procedure that is used by the solution value to determine the division of v(N ). In what follows, we will
only be concerned with the procedural aspects of solution values.
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one finds8 that L A = 1 and LC = 0. The τ -value is then obtained9 as the following
compromise between the vector of lower payoffs L and the vector of upper payoffsU :
τ(N , v) = λ · U + (1 − λ) · L with λ determined by
∑
i∈N
τi = v(N ) (4)
Although (4) clearly reveals in which sense the τ -value is a compromise between the
lower payoffs and upper payoffs, the following (equivalent) expression clearly lays
bare in which sense proportionality plays a role.
τi (N , v) = Li + (Ui − Li )∑
j∈N (Uj − L j )
·
⎛
⎝v(N ) −
∑
j∈N
L j
⎞
⎠ (5)
And so in Gloves, the τ -value proposes to allot 32 to Ann, 1 to Bernie and
1
2 to Charlie,
as the reader may easily verify in terms of (5). Indeed, for Gloves, the allocations
proposed by the τ -value and the Shapley value coincide.
And so, cooperative game theory provides us with means to approach fair division
problems present in situations such as Gloves whereas Curtis’ and Broome’s limited
theories of fairness do not have such means.10 Of course, Gloves is only a toy example
but cooperative game theory can and has been used to analyse fair division problems
that arise in a wide variety of situations, such as the division of profits from production
or joint ventures. Although cooperative game theory offers quite some solution values
bywhich such a division can be obtained, only the τ -value, as revealed by (5), explicitly
appeals to the notion of proportionality. And so, whereas fair division problems such
as Gloves are outside the scope of Broomean theories of fairness, they may be inside
the scope of a broader theory of fairness that upholds the connection between fairness
and proportionality by appealing to the τ -value. However, in order to be successful,
such a theory needs a conception of fairness from which such an appeal to the τ -value
can be justified. It is clearly beyond the scope of the present paper to offer such a
conception.
4.3 Fairness and proportionality
In the previous section, we have seen that cooperative game theory may be of help
whenwewant to be fair in situations that are outside the scope of Curtis’ and Broome’s
8 So in this case, the lower payoff of each agent i is equal to the value v({i}) he realizes by acting alone.
In general, this need not be the case.
9 As the reader may observe, the τ -value for a cooperative game (N , v) is only defined when both L ≤ U
and
∑
j∈N L j ≤ v(N ) ≤
∑
j∈N U j . Games that satisfy these two conditions are called quasi-balanced.
The limitation of the τ -value to quasi-balanced games can be seen as a weakness of the τ -value. But,
as Jene and Zelewski (2012, p. 181) point out, ‘a weakness would only exist if theoretically interesting
or practically relevant instances of [cooperative games] that do not belong to the class of quasi-balanced
games were specified. This has not been the case up to now.’
10 The potential rejoinder that fairness is fundamentally a function of (Broomean) claims, as coalitional
strength can be understood in terms of claims, will be addressed at the end of Sect. 4.
123
Synthese
theories of fairness. Interestingly though, cooperative game theory has also been used
to analyse claims problems, i.e. the situations that are inside the scope of these theories.
An essential part of such analysis is the construction of the cooperative game induced
by a claims problem, which is aptly illustrated via the Bankruptcy example of Sect. 2.
Remember that the characteristic function v of a cooperative game represents the value
that a coalition can guarantee itself. And so, as Claire had only 200 on her savings
account, Ari and Betty can jointly guarantee themselves v({A, B}) = 900 − 200 =
700. Indeed, Bankruptcy induces the following Bankruptcy Game:
v (∅) = 0 v ({A}) = 300 v ({B}) = 0 v ({C}) = 0
v ({A, B}) = 700 v ({A,C}) = 500 v ({B,C}) = 100 v ({A, B,C}) = 900
(6)
More generally, the cooperative game that is induced by a claims problem is defined
as follows.
Definition 7 Let C = (E, N , c) be a claims problem. The claims game (N , vC) that
is induced by C is defined as follows:
vC(S) = max
{
0, E −
∑
i /∈S
ci
}
for each S ⊆ N
An inspection of Definition 1 and 7 reveals that, with C a claims problem and with
vC the claims game induced by C, we have that vC(N ) = E , the value of the grand
coalition in the game coincides with the estate of the problem. This observation shows
that two methods are available to divide the estate in a claims problem C: directly, by
applying one of the division rules discussed in Sect. 2 to C or indirectly, by applying
one of the solution values mentioned in Sect. 4.2 to the claims game vC . A rule r
is said to coincide with solution value S when, for each claims problem C, dividing
directly by r coincides with dividing indirectly by S.
We will call a rule that coincides with a solution value ‘robust’. To explain this
label, consider Bankruptcy again. One may model Bankruptcy as a claims problem, as
we did in Sect. 2. Doing so, the division of the 900 Euro can proceed in terms of one of
the division rules that were discussed in Sect. 2, and the methodology of the axiomatic
approach becomes available in terms of which the fairness of such division rules can
be investigated. On the other hand, one may model Bankruptcy as a cooperative game,
as we did above. Indeed, one may model the fact that Ari had 800 on his savings
account by endowing him with a claim cA of 800, or one may model the fact that
Betty and Claire jointly have 600 on their saving accounts as indicating that Ari can
guarantee himself v({A}) = 900 − 600 = 300. When the latter perspective is taken,
the division of the 900 Euro can proceed in terms of one of the solution values that
were discussed in Sect. 4.2, and themethodology of cooperative game-theory becomes
available in terms of which the fairness of such solution values can be investigated.
Thus, we have one fair division situation that can be modelled in two different ways.
Say that one has a (non-Broomean) theory of fairness that allows one to asses the
fairness of both division rules and of solution values—and note that the need for such
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a theory is illustrated by situations such as Gloves. Arguably, a desirable feature of
such a theory of fairness is that the allocation of the 900 Euros in Bankruptcy (and
similar situations) does not depend on the manner in which Bankruptcy is modelled.
That is to say, it is a desirable feature of such a theory of fairness that its preferred
division rule coincides with its preferred solution value. For instance, the 900 Euros
in Bankruptcy and the 4 Euros in Gloves can then be divided according to the very
same principles. A necessary condition for the realization of this desirable feature is
that the division rule r that is proposed by the theory is robust: there should at least be
a solution value that coincides with r .
An interesting example of a robust rule is the Talmud rule (T) that was (implicitly)
proposed as a fair division rule in the Talmud. Around 2000 years later, Schmeidler
(1969) proposed the nucleolus as a fair solution value for cooperative games, and
Aumann and Maschler (1985) showed that T coincides with the nucleolus, and so T is
robust in our sense. Although many division rules are robust11, the proportional rule
P is not one of them, as the following proposition attests.
Proposition 3 With C = (E, N , c) a claims problem, let C = (E, N , c) be the claims
problem that is defined just like C except that all claims are truncated to E, i.e.
ci = min{E, ci } for each agent i . There is a a solution value S such that r coincides
with S if and only if, for each claims problem C, applying r to C yields the same division
as applying r to C.
Proof Curiel et al. (1988). unionsq
An immediate consequence of Proposition 3 is that P is not robust. Now, from the
perspective of Curtis (or Broome), one may not be too worried about this result. For
Proposition 3 essentially tells us that the only way in which a division rule can be
robust is by considering the part of a claim that exceeds the estate—if there is such
part—as irrelevant. There is nothing in the Broomean notion of a claim—a duty we
owe to the agent—that justifies this attitude towards estate-exceeding claims. Yet, we
(and others) already argued that not all fair division problems are cast in terms of
Broomean claims. At the end of Sect. 4.2, we already hinted at a theory of fairness
that gives up the Broomean notion of a claim but that keeps a connection between
fairness and proportionality. We argued that for such a theory, the τ -value may be
an appealing solution value. Interestingly, the Adjusted Proportional rule is a robust
division rule that coincides with the τ -value.
Theorem 2 LetC = (E, N , c) be an arbitrary claims problemand let vC be the claims
game that is induced by C. Applying the AP rule to C results in the same allocation as
applying the τ -value to vC .
Proof Curiel et al. (1988). unionsq
And so, for a non-Broomean theory of fairness that wants to keep a connection between
fairness and proportionality, the AP rule seems to be an attractive division rule.
11 As another example, the Run to the Bank rule, mentioned in Sect. 2.2, coincides with the Shapley value
and hence, it is robust. For yet another example, see Theorem 2 below.
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Wewant to conclude this section by addressing a potential objection to an argument
made earlier.Wepointed out that a fair division of the 4Euros inGloves can be obtained
by applying a solution value to theGlovesGame.Hence, a fair division of the 4Euros is
obtained as a function of coalitional strength, that is, of howmuch leverage each agent
has in terms of forming beneficial coalitions. The thought that, in Gloves, fairness is a
function of coalitional strength is in conflict with the Broomean thought that fairness is
always a function of claims. Gloves (which clearly gives rise to a fair division problem)
thereby seems to discredit the Broomean account of fairness. However, Broome and
Curtis may argue that fairness is fundamentally a function of (Broomean) claims, as
coalitional strength can be understood in terms of claims. That is, they may argue that
the structure of the Gloves situation as given by the Gloves game is induced by a more
fundamental structure that can be spelled out in terms of claims. For instance, they
could argue that the fact that Ann can guarantee herself 1 Euro can be explained in
terms of (implicit) claims on the 4 Euros that can be ascribed to Bernie and Charlie.
The following proposition attests that this kind of argument is impossible.
Proposition 4 Let v be the Gloves Game as given by (3). For no claims problem C
we have that vC = v.
Proof Let v be the Gloves Game and suppose that there is a claims problem C =
(E, {A, B,C}, c) such that vC = v. Then, as vC({A, B,C}) = 4, the estate E should
equal 4. Further, as vC({A, B}) = 3, it follows that Charlie’s claim cC = 1. Likewise,
one derives that cA = 2 and that cB = 3. But then vC({A}) = 4 − 3 − 1 = 0 =
v({A}) = 1 which is absurd. unionsq
Hence, simply pointing out that any context in which we may want to say some-
thing about fairness should be re-described as an allocation situation with Broomean
claims won’t work: the latter cannot always be constructed on the basis of fair division
problems such as Gloves. Theorising about fair division problemswill thus be severely
restricted if it is limited to those in which highly idealised claims Broomean claims
are given. We will elaborate on this restriction a bit further in the next section.
5 Coda: fair division problems, allocative justice, distributive justice
Let us again reflect more generally about the preceding explorations. We have con-
sidered the challenge, issued by Hooker (2005) and Tomlin (2012), against the highly
restrictive notion of Broomean claims, which have been employed in Curtis’ (2014)
theory of fairness. In Sect. 4.2, we showed that cooperative game theory is a framework
that allows us to explore notions of fair divisions in contexts in which no Broomean
claims are given. In Sect. 4.3, we then showed that many division rules coincide with
a solution value of cooperative game-theory, but not the proportional rule. We also
showed that there is a class of fair division problems in which Broomean claims cannot
be constructed.
Where do these suggestions leave us? We think it important to appreciate that the
problems considered by Broomean theories of fairness, and by the axiomatic and
game-theoretic approaches used in our article, are somewhat different from more
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fundamental considerations covered by theories of distributive justice. At the same
time, it is not quite clear in what respect these problems are different exactly, and
how to distinguish between fair division problems and those of distributive justice.
Consider this passage from Rawls, in which he introduces one way of distinguishing
allocative and distributive justice:
By contrast [to distributive justice] allocative justice applies when a given col-
lection of goods is to be divided among definite individuals with known desires
and needs. The goods to be allotted are not produced by these individuals, nor do
these individuals stand in any existing cooperative relation. Since there are no
prior claims on the things to be distributed, it is natural to share them out accord-
ing to desires and needs, or even to maximize the net balance of satisfaction.
Justice becomes a kind of efficiency, unless equality is preferred. Suitably gen-
eralized, the allocative conception leads to the classical utilitarian view.’ (Rawls
1971, p. 77)
There are many ways in which this quote describes allocative justice that corre-
sponds closely to the kind of fair division problems that we have analysed in this
article. For instance, in both Bankruptcy and Gloves, there are fixed amounts of goods
to be distributed, and agents have claims, preferences, or contributions that need to be
recognized when one wants ‘to be fair’. At the same time, there is clearly something
about these cases that does not make them straightforward to treat by simple utility
maximisation.
How does this passage from Rawls relate to the theories that we covered in this
article? Reconciling the notion of Broomean claims with this passage from Rawls is
difficult. On the one hand, Broomean claims seem to go together quite well with Rawls
stating that there is no cooperation or production. Likewise, Rawls also seems close
to the idea of efficiency as expressed in Curtis (2014) FC(i). And it seems to us that
in general, the spirit in which Rawls defines allocative justice is quite similar to what
Broomean theories of fairness attempt to cover. On the other hand, Rawls does seem
to assume that allocative justice deals with the currency of utility, rather than agents’
entitlements as Broome does. Reconciling the axiomatic and cooperative game theory
literature with this passage from Rawls is also not straightforward. As we have seen,
cooperative game theory applies to cases in which there is cooperation and production,
contrary to the above. Likewise, axiomatic approaches and cooperative game theory
are not bound to one currency of utility (although most work done in these approaches
assume it).
Interestingly, while the examples of Bankruptcy and Gloves proved to be poignant
ways in which to explore relations between Broomean theories of fairness and the
economic literature, the picture looks much more complex when it comes to define
the field in which these theories operate: there is no straightforward correspondence
between Rawls, Broome, and the authors that responded to the latter and the economic
literature. We highlight this fact for several reasons: firstly, we think this might partly
explain why even though there is a long tradition in theories of allocative and distrib-
utive justice to integrate philosophy and economics (such as in the work of Gauthier
(1986), Roemer (1998), Fleurbaey (2008), and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2011), to
name only a few), Broomean theories of fairness have so far proceeded in isolation
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from the economic literature. Secondly, we also think that our discussion suggests
that it is an open question whether there is in fact a clearcut distinction between fair
division, allocative justice, and distributive justice: there might be interesting relations
between methods used in either area.
Neither do we wish to defend views on fundamental questions such as whether and
how to distinguish between fair division, allocative justice, and distributive justice, nor
do we want to put allocative justice as the definite label for the kinds of problems we
have considered here.We do however think that theorising about fair division problems
will benefit from clarifying suchmatters in the future. Our contribution in this article is
confined to issue the specific challenges to Curtis and Broome, as developed in Sects. 2
and 4, as well as to generally suggest that themethods of axiomatic and game-theoretic
approaches should not be ignored when thinking about fair division problems.
6 Conclusions
We have introduced axiomatic and game theoretic approaches from economics to
confront current philosophical debates on fair division problems. Confronting the
philosophical literature with these methods yields a number of interesting results.
Firstly, we show that the proportionality method advocated in Curtis (2014) is not
implied by a general principle of fairness, and that the proportional rule cannot be
explicated axiomatically from that very principle. Secondly, we show that adopting
Broome’s (1990) restricted definition of the scope of theorising about fair division
problems excludes some of the most important such problems in which one would like
to analyse fairness, and that game-theoretic approaches can rectify this shortcoming.
We thus demonstrate that using axiomatic and game-theoretic work in economics can
rectify shortcomings in the philosophical literature on fair division problems, and argue
that it is an indispensable ingredient of any theorizing about fair division, allocative
justice, and distributive justice.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Lemma 1 Let (E, N , c) be a claims problem and let k, l ∈ N be such that ck < cl .
Then APk(E, N , c) < APl(E, N , c) ⇐⇒ ck < E.
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Proof Let us first present the formal definition of the AP rule in order to facilitate our
proof. Let (E, N , c) be a claims problem. For each agent i ∈ N , mi = max{0, E −∑
j =i c j } denotes the minimal right of agent i . We use ER = E −
∑
i∈N mi to denote
the remaining estate and we leave it to the reader to observe that the definition of a
claims problem implies that ER > 0. Further, we use cRi = min{ER, ci − mi } to
denote the remaining claim of agent i and we let cR denote the reduced claims vector
thus obtained. The amount allotted to agent i by the AP rule may thus be expressed as
APi (E, N , c) = mi + Pi
(
ER, N , cR
)
(7)
Left-to-right direction. Reason by contraposition. Let k, l ∈ N be such that ck < cl
and suppose that ck ≥ E . Then also cl ≥ E . It readily follows that mk = ml = 0 and
that cRk = cRl = ER . As P satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals it readily follows from
(7) that APk(E, N , c) = APl(E, N , c), which establishes the desired result.
Right-to-left direction. Let us first find a convenient expression for the remaining
estate ER . To do so, let C = ∑i∈N ci and L = C − E . We than have that mi =
max{0, E − ∑ j =i c j } = max{0, E − C + ci } = max{0, ci − L}. Now let S = {i ∈
N | mi > 0} and let T = N − S. We have:
ER = E −
∑
i∈S
(ci − L) +
∑
i∈T
ci −
∑
i∈T
ci = (| S | −1) · L +
∑
i∈T
ci (8)
Now let k, l ∈ N be such that ck < cl and suppose that ck < E . Suppose that
S = ∅. Then mk = ml = 0 and ER = E . And so cRk = min{E, ck} = ck and
cRl = min{E, cl} > ck . As mk = ml = 0 and as P satisfies Strict Order Preservation,
it follows from (7) that APk(E, N , c) < APl(E, N , c). For the remainder of the proof,
we may thus suppose that S = ∅.
Suppose that ml = 0. As ck < cl , it follows that mk ≤ ml and hence that mk = 0.
As S = ∅ and as l, k ∈ T , it follows from (8) that cRk = ck and that cRl = cl . Again,
the desired result follows from the fact that P satisfies Strict Order Preservation. Now
suppose that ml > 0 and that mk = 0. As S = ∅ and as k ∈ T , it follows from
(8) that cRk = min{ER, ck} = ck . As ml > 0, it follows that ml = cl − L so that
cRl = min{ER, L}. As mk = 0, it follows that ck − L ≤ 0 and so ck ≤ L . Thus
cRk = ck ≤ min{ER, L} = cRl . As ml > mk and as P satisfies Equal Treatment
of Equals and Strict Order Preservation, the desired result follows from (7). Finally,
suppose that ml > 0 and that mk > 0. It follows that cRk = cRl = min{ER, L} and, as
ck < cl , that mk < ml . Hence, as P satisfies Equal Treatment of Equals , the desired
result follows from (7). unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1
Proposition 2 P does and CP does not satisfy Strict Claim Monotonicity.
Proof Let us first present the formal definition of Strict Claim Monotonicity in order
to facilitate our proof. Let C = (E, N , c) and C′ = (E, N , c′) be two claim problems
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with the same estate E and the same set of agents N and with claims vectors c and c′
such that:
(∃i ∈ N : ci < c′i
)
and
(
∀ j ∈ N : j = i ⇒ c j = c′j
)
A division rule r satisfies Strict Claim Monotonicity just in case ri (E, N , c) <
ri (E, N , c′).
P satisfies Strict Claim Monotonicity. Let C and C′ be as indicated above and let
C = ∑i∈N ci and C ′ =
∑
i∈N c′i the sums of claims in, respectively, C and C′. Let
j = i ∈ N and observe that, as C < C ′:
Pj (E, N , c) = c j
C
>
c j
C ′
= Pj
(
E, N , c′
)
(9)
Thus, (9) tells us that, for each agent j other than i , P allots more to j in C than in
C′. As P satisfies Efficiency, it readily follows that P allots more to i in C′ than in C,
which is what we had to show.
To show that CP does not satisfy Strict Claim Monotonicity, we give a counterex-
ample. Let C = (E, N , c) and C′ = (E, N , c′) be such that E = 500, N = {1, 2, 3},
c1 = 800, c′1 = 801, c2 = c′2 = 400 and c3 = c′3 = 200. Observe that
CPi (E, N , c) = APi (E, N , c) = APi (E, N , c′) = CPi (E, N , c′), and so CP vio-
lates Strict Claim Monotonicity. unionsq
Pre-application and post-application relational properties
Whereas Self-Duality is a pre-application relational property, Composition is a post-
application relational property. The following definition of Composition will facilitate
our explanation of the difference between pre- and post-application relational proper-
ties.
Definition 8 (Composition) Let r be a rule and let (E, N , c), (E ′, N ′, c′) and
(E ′′, N ′′, c′′) be claims problems that are related as follows:
E = E ′ + E ′′, N ′ = N , c′ = c, c′′ = c − r (E ′, N , c) (10)
r satisfies Composition iff for any three claims problems that respect (10), we have
that
r(E, N , c) = r (E ′, N ′, c′) + r (E ′′, N ′′, c′′) (11)
Definition 8 clearly shows that Composition is a relational property: if claims
problems are related as in (10)—the application condition of Composition—then a
division rule must, in order to satisfy Composition, treat them as in (11)—the treat-
ment condition of Composition. As the application condition of Self-Duality can be
specified without applying the division rule that figures in its treatment condition, it is
a pre-application relational property. In order to specify the application condition of
Composition, however, we need to apply the division rule that figures in its treatment
condition, and so Composition is a post-application relational property.
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